This study de scribes a RELAP5 com puter code for ther mal-hy drau lic anal y sis of a typ i cal pres sur ized wa ter re ac tor. RELAP5 is used to cal cu late the ther mal hy drau -
In tro duc tion
A ma jor safety ad van tage of pas sive plants is that long-term ac ci dent mit i ga tion is main tained with out op er a tor ac tion or re li ance on off-site or on-site AC power. New pas sive plants use ex ten sively an a lyzed and tested pas sive sys tems to im prove the safety of the plant. The pas sive safety sys tems are sig nif i cantly sim pler than tra di tional PWR safety sys tems and do not re quire the large net work of safety sup port sys tems needed by typ i cal nu clear plants. That in cludes AC power, heat ing, ven ti la tion, air con di tion ing, cool ing wa ter sys tems, and the seismic build ings needed to house these com po nents [1] .
Pas sive sys tems use grav ity, nat u ral cir cu la tion, and com pressed gas. No pumps, fans, die sels, chill ers, or other ro tat ing ma chines are used in the safety sub-sys tems. New pas sive -pressurizer (1 for the plant), -steam generator (SG) (1 for each loop), -reactor pressure vessel (1 for the plant), -reactor coolant pump (1 for each loop), -connecting pipes, and -passive safety injection system (2 systems).
The nom i nal plant op er at ing pa ram e ters are given in tab. 1.
The nodalization of the ref er ence PWR plant model used in this work rep re sents the stan dard nodalization scheme used at INL. A sche matic of the nodalization of the typ i cal PWR sys tem used in this work is shown in fig. 2 . Figure 3 shows the two pas sive safety in jec tion sys tems used in this work. These two pas sive in jec tion sys tems are: -high pressure safety injection tank, and -me dium pres sure safety in jec tion sys tem (ac cu mula tor). High pres sure safety in jec tion sys tems are used when the nor mal makeup sys tem is in ad e quate or is unavail able. They are filled with cold bo rated wa ter and de signed to func tion at any re ac tor cool ant sys tem (RCS) pres sure us ing only grav ity, and the tem per a ture and height dif fer ences from the RCS cold leg as the mo ti vat ing forces [4] . These tanks are lo cated above the RCS loop pip ing. If the wa ter level or pres sure in the pressurizer reaches a set low level, the re ac tor, as well as the re actor cool ant pumps, is trip ped and the tanks dis charge iso la tion valves open au to mat i cally. The wa ter from the high pres sure in jec tion (HPI) tanks recirculates then flows by grav ity through the re ac tor ves sel. It is al ways that the pri mary pres sure and nat u ral cir cu la tion is es tab lished when valves are open and cold bo rated wa ter en ters re ac tor and hot pri mary wa ter flows to HPI thank head. The de tailed gov ern ing equa tions of the HPI sys tems are founded in ref er ences [5, 6] .
Me dium pres sure safety in jec tion, ac cu mu la tors, are re quired for loss of cool ant ac cidents (LOCAs) to meet the im me di ate need for higher ini tial makeup flows to re fill the re ac tor ves sel lower ple num and downcomer fol low ing the RCS blowdown. The ac cu mu la tors are pressur ized to about 5 MPa with ni tro gen gas [7] . The pres sure dif fer en tial be tween the pres sur ized ac cu mu la tors and the drop ping RCS pres sure ul ti mately forces open check valves that nor mally iso late the ac cu mu la tors from the RCS. The ac cu mu la tors con tinue de liv ery to sup ple ment the HPI sys tems in main tain ing wa ter cov er age of the core.
Model val i da tion
Model val i da tion is im por tant to de ter mine whether a phys i cal model can prop erly describe the phe nom ena they are de signed to sim u late. Val i da tion is based on the o ret i cal anal y sis (typ i cal be hav ior), ex per i men tal, or nu mer i cal as sess ment.
As the re sults is sued from nu mer i cal sim u la tions of tran sients and ac ci dents in real reac tors can not be com pared with ex per i men tal re sults, the de tec tion of a mis take in the nu mer i cal model is im pos si ble. Thus a pre lim i nary work of val i da tion of the model is compul sory [8] . The val i da tion of the model used in this work is done by two dif fer ent meth ods: nu mer i cal and the o ret i cal val ida tion meth ods.
Nu mer i cal val i da tion (Con ver gence of the re sults around ini tial con di tions)
The first val i da tion method of the used model is ob tained by per form ing a com pu ta tion un der nor mal op er at ing con di tions. The tran sients ex trem ity remains clogged. As com pu ta tions are in itial ized ap prox i mately in op er at ing condi tions, the con ver gence of the re sults around the ini tial con di tions is suf fi cient to prove that the model is cor rect and fig.  4 shows the con ver gence of the re sults of the pres sure of the pressurizer when we use dif fer ent ini tial con di tions.
The o ret i cal val i da tion (Typ i cal be hav ior of a ref er ence ac ci dent)
An other method of val i da tion is a com par i son of ac ci den tal be hav ior of the cur rent used model with the typ i cal behav ior of the ac ci dents which is well under stood as ex plained in refs. [9] [10] [11] [12] . Station black out ac ci dent (SBO) is taken as an ex am ple for val i da tion. SBO ac ci dent is an im por tant se quence that in duced core dam age. It is ini ti ated by a loss of alter nat ing cur rent (AC) power and also loss of off-site power. De cay heat removal can not be main tained for a long time be cause there is no AC power for the mo tor driven pumps, and the turbine-driven aux il iary feed wa ter (AFW) pumps are also as sumed fail to sup ply wa ter.
In the cur rent case for val i da tion, it is as sumed that the ac ci dent and the re ac tor trip oc cur at 0.0 sec ond and the RCS trip oc curs at 150 sec onds. Also it is as sumed that no re cov ery ac tion is taken. Fol low ing a re ac tor trip, the RCS pres sure must drop due to a sud den de crease in heat gen er a tion from the core. When the SG dry out, the RCS vol ume ex pan sion and pres sur iza tion oc curs. Steam gen er a tors lose their heat re moval ca pa bil ity be cause of dry out of the sec ond ary side if power can not be restored. Heat up of the pri mary cool ant by de cay heat pres sur izes the RCS to the set point of the pressurizer power-op er ated re lief valves (PORVs). Cool ant in ven tory in the RCS de creases because of steam boil off through cy cling of the PORVs. The core is un cov ered and even tu ally dam aged if the power can not be re cov ered in time. This typ i cal be hav ior is shown in fig. 5 .
Re sults and dis cus sion
Af ter run ning the model un der nor mal op er a tion con di tions for suit able time to reach sta bility and af ter check ing of the model con sis tency by chang ing the ini tial con di tions ( fig. 4) as shown in pre vi ous sec tion, the tran sients and ac ci dents sim u la tion may be now car ried out.
Two ac ci dent sce nar ios are taken as base cases in this work. These two sce nar ios are: -small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA), and -station blackout (SBO).
SBLOCA is mod eled in RELAP5 by sim u lat ing the rup ture by us ing an imag i nary valve which mod eled be tween the place of the break and a sink vol ume. SBO is mod eled by stop ping RCS pumps and clos ing feedwater valves.
The base case of SBLOCA se quence as sumes that the small breaks with dif fer ent diam e ters (start ing from 5 inches break) oc cur in the cold leg of the plant. The re cov ery ac tion of the two used pas sive emer gency core cool ing sys tem is ex am ined in all the cases. The main atten tion is "Can we say the plant is safe by us ing these two pas sive emer gency core cool ing systems (ECCS) in the case of SBLOCA for 1500 sec onds af ter the ac ci dent?" and if the an swer is yes, "To what ex tent we can say that?"
The base case of SBO se quence as sumes that the SBO oc curs at time 0.0 sec ond and dif fer ent op er a tor ac tions are mod eled to mit i gate this ac ci dent. The main at ten tion is "Can we de crease the de pend ence on the op er a tor ac tion by us ing au to matic depressurization sys tem in the case of SBO for 4000 sec onds af ter the ac ci dent?" Ta bles 2 and 3 show the an a lyt i cal re sults of both cases SBLOCA and SBO sce nar ios, re spec tively.
The cases which are mod eled are the fol low ing:
SBLOCA:
-base case (without action) for 5, 6, 7, and 8 inches cold leg rupture, -5 inches clod leg rupture with passive ECCS, -6 inches cold leg rupture with passive ECCS, -7 inches cold leg rupture with passive ECCS, and -8 inches cold leg rupture with passive ECCS.
SBO: -base case (without action), -10 min. operator action, -30 min. operator action,and -45 min. operator action. fig. 9 shows (for all the cases) the time re sponse of the fol low ing impor tant pa ram e ters: normalized level of both passive ECCS used, level of water above the bottom of the core, and max i mum clad tem per a ture (which must not ex ceeds 1472 K [13] ).
Fig ure 6 through

Con clu sion and fu ture work
We have pre sented mod els that in crease the ef fec tive ness and the abil ity to pre dict the re sponse of nu clear power plants in dif fer ent cases: nor mal op er a tion, operational transients, and hypothetical accidents.
We have mod eled a new PWR power plant with two pas sive ECCS: HPI pas sive tanks and MPI ac cu mu la tors. Fig ure 7 clearly shows that the mod eled PWR is safe in the case of SBLOCA un til size of 7 inches break 1500 seconds af ter the ac ci dent by us ing only two short term pas sive ECCS with out any op er a tor ac tion. The core melts af ter 1500 seconds if the break size is equal to 8 inches as shown in fig. 8(b) .
Pas sive safety de signs have suc ceeded in min i miz ing the de pend ence on the op er a tor ac tions as shown in the mod el ing of SBO sce nar ios with dif fer ent time re sponse of the op er a tor ac tions. If an au to matic depressurizing con cept is used with pas sive ECCS in jec tion, the op er ator duty will be elim i nated to tally. Us ing more pas sive safety sys tems en hance "safety mar gins" of nu clear power plants be cause the very quick re sponse of the pas sive sys tems which do not de pend on op er a tor ac tion. That is be cause the very im por tant con clu sion that the new de signs suc ceeded in min i miz ing the de pend ency on the op er a tor ac tion in some kinds of ac ci dents as SBLOCA and SBO.
Fu ture work can fo cus on: modeling of more different accident scenarios to implement passive safety fea tures, modeling complete passive power plant, studying safety of passive safety plants for longer times, and studying to know which place in the RCS cycle is more suitable to be the driving force to the HPI system. The fu ture work must be con cen trated on the anal y sis of the other dif fer ent types of acci dents to see to which de gree the us ing of pas sive safety sys tems in crease the safety mar gins and also mod el ing other pas sive safety sys tems to cover larger time scales af ter the ac ci dents.
